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ABSTRACT
This paper discusses major analytical aspects of dollarization and their practical implications. We
develop a simple model to stress that dollarization implies the loss of independent monetary policy and
of seigniorage, yet the significance of such losses can only be evaluated in conjunction with assumptions
about the policymaking process. If the government is benevolent and has no credibility problems,
dollarization causes a fall in welfare, which can be measured by the implied seigniorage loss or using
Mundellian optimal currency area criteria. However, outcomes are rather different if credibility is absent
and dollarization can serve as a commitment device: the welfare impact of dollarization is ambiguous,
and seigniorage measures and Mundellian criteria may be misleading indicators of the true cost of
dollarization. We also evaluate other implications of dollarization, such as those related to last resort
lending and financial stability.
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1 Introduction
Dollarization would involve beneﬁts as well as costs for a developing country.
The identiﬁcation of those costs and beneﬁts, as well as the measurement
of their relative importance, is the subject of a currently heated debate. To
place the arguments in perspective and aid in the discussion, this chapter
presents and summarizes main analytical considerations related to dollariza-
tion.
The usefulness of theory in evaluating dollarization cannot be overempha-
sized. There are very few observed cases of dollarization, and hence history
provides little guidance as to its consequences. One must then resort to
theoretical analysis for conjectures about how dollarization may work. Un-
fortunately, received theory has some important gaps, some of which will
become apparent below. However, there are also several points of agree-
ment; we shall emphasize those, as well as some observations that have been
relatively ignored in the current debate.
Our discussion is organized around a very simple model of a small open
economy with a government that must decide whether to dollarize. We start
by discussing the implications of dollarization for macroeconomic policy;
much of the current debate has been concerned with precisely this issue.
∗We are indebted to Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Will Roberds, and Federico Sturzeneg-
ger for useful comments and suggestions. Of course, we are solely responsible for any
shortcomings.
1In our framework we show that, as emphasized in the literature, dollariza-
tion would prevent the implementation of an optimal policy. This is because
the exchange rate would no longer serve as an adjustment tool and, in this
respect, dollarization resembles an irrevocably ﬁxed exchange rate system.
However, dollarization implies a further loss, namely that the stock of do-
mestic base money would have to be retired from circulation and exchanged
for dollars. In other words, the so called (stock) seigniorage would accrue to
the US Federal Reserve. The welfare costs of dollarization, relative to the
optimal policy, are due to both the ﬁxity of exchange rates and the loss of
seigniorage. The magnitude of the costs are shown to depend on the variabil-
ity of the exogenous shocks hitting the economy, a ﬁnding that is reminiscent
of Mundell’s (1961) optimal currency area approach.
The costs just identiﬁed are only relevant if the government, in fact,
implements an optimal policy. But this may not be the case, in particular if
the government is not able to commit, at the beginning of time, to date-state
contingent policies. In that case, the analysis of the determination of policy,
and hence the cost of dollarization, must take into account the possibility
of time inconsistency or lack of credibility, and how dollarization may help
ameliorating those problems.
We discuss the possibility that dollarization may act as a commitment
device, and thus reduce the distortion associated with policy incredibility. It
follows from the discussion, however, that whether dollarization is desirable
under such circumstances is, at the end, an empirical matter. Dollarization
buys credibility at the expense of a suboptimal response to shocks, and may
or may not be worth it.
We also emphasize that, when there is a policy credibility problem, the
interpretation of the seigniorage lost with dollarization is delicate. In partic-
ular, the measured dollar loss of seigniorage may be associated with an in-
crease in social welfare. The implication is that computed seigniorage losses
can only be unambiguously interpreted as ”real losses” to the economy if
policy credibility problems are assumed away, a point that seemes to have
been missed in the debate. A similar caveat applies, although perhaps not
as starkly, to the Mundellian criteria.
The possibility of ﬁnancial panics and exchange rate crises has provided
a strong impetus to calls for dollarization. Hence we discuss the role of
dollarization in generating or preventing crises within our simple model. We
show that dollarization would prevent the domestic central bank from acting
as a lender of last resort which, as in Chang and Velasco (2000a, 2000b), may
2exacerbate ﬁnancial fragility and the possibility of crises. However, we also
argue that there are solutions to that problem, such as Argentina’s policy
of contracting contingent lines of credit with foreign banks, that may be
inexpensive.
In addition to analyzing the lender of last resort issue, we tackle the
contention that dollarization can be hoped to reduce the severity of the shocks
hitting the economy or reduce the cost of foreign credit. We argue that both
contentions are unwarranted and, in fact, we describe examples in which
exactly the opposite would be true. In particular, if dollarization indeed
increased the possibility of crises relative to a domestic currency regime,
rational expectations imply that country risk would increase, reﬂecting a
compensation to foreign creditors for defaults during crises.
Finally, we identify some putative consequences of dollarization that, at
least so far, resist an analytical treatment. An example is the contention
that dollarization would reduce market incompleteness.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the
economic environment. Section 3 discusses optimal macroeconomic policy
a n dt h ee ﬀ e c tt h a td o l l a r i z a t i o nw o u l dh a v eo ni t .T h ee ﬀ e c t so fd o l l a r i z a t i o n
on the credibility of government policy are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5
discusses how dollarization aﬀects the availability of a lender of last resort.
Section 6 considers a number of issues not included in our formal discussion.
Section 7 concludes.
2 The Economic Environment
In this section we describe the model that will serve as the focal point of
our discussion. We should emphasize that below we impose a number of
exceedingly strong and seemingly ad hoc assumptions. However, this is only
for expositional purposes and because we hope that, in this way, our basic
points will be most transparent. Indeed, most of the assumptions below can
be substantially relaxed, and hence our results can be extended to much more
realistic setups.
Consider a small home economy that is part of a much larger world and
lasts for only two periods, indexed by t =1 ,2.1 In each period there is a
single, perishable consumption good, which is fully traded and has a ﬁxed
price, normalized to one, in terms of a world currency (the dollar).
1This economy is a version of that in Persson and Tabellini (1990, chapter 6).
3The home economy is inhabited by a large number of identical individuals
and a government. The representative agent is endowed with some amount
e>0 of the consumption good in period 1.I np e r i o d2 he has no endowment
of goods, but he can produce l units of consumption by working l hours,
0 ≤ l ≤ 1.
The representative individual enjoys consumption and dislikes labor ef-
fort. In addition, he is assumed to derive utility from holding the currency
that circulates in the home economy. Which currency circulates at home is a
government decision. Under a dollarization plan, that currency is the dollar.
However, the government may also impose the use of a domestic currency,
called peso, which can be costlessly created and destroyed by a domestic
central bank.
For simplicity, we assume that home residents can only save by holding
currency. Hence the preferences of the representative agent are given by
u(c1)+v(m1)+E[c2 + v(m2) − H(l)] (1)
where E[.] is the expectation operator; u, v,a n dH are continuously diﬀeren-
tiable, strictly increasing and strictly concave functions; ct denotes consump-
tion in period t;a n dmt is the real value of currency holdings at the end
of period t. Note that, under dollarization, mt denotes a holding of dollars,
while in a domestic currency regime, mt = Mt/Pt,w h e r eMt denotes the
holding of pesos and Pt is the peso price of consumption. In the latter case,
and because the Law of One Price holds, Pt must also equal the exchange
rate, the price of dollars in terms of pesos.
The presence of the expectation operator E[.] in (1) allows for the inclu-
sion of uncertainty in the model. To be concrete, we shall assume that one
of S possible states is realized in period 2. The realization of one of these
states determines a number of macroeconomic variables, two of which are of
concern to the representative agent: the rate of a tax on labor income and,
in a peso regime, the exchange rate.
All of these assumptions imply that, under dollarization, the budget con-
straints of the representative agent can be written as
c1 + m1 ≤ e (2)
m2s + c2s ≤ (1 − τs)ls + m1,s =1 ,2,..,S (3)
4where τ denotes the tax rate in labor income and, in 3 and the rest of this
chapter, a subscript s refers to a value that is contingent on the realization
of state s.
In contrast, the budget constraints in a regime of domestic currency are
given by
P1c1 + M1 ≤ P1e (4)
M2s + P2sc2s ≤ (1 − τs)P2sc2s + M1, all s (5)
However, note that, after dividing both sides by P1, 4 reduces to 2. Also,
5 can be rewritten as
m2s + c2s ≤ (1 − τs)ls + m1(1 − πs) (6)
which is the same as 3, except for the presence of the term (1−πs)=P1/P2s.
The term πs =( P2s − P1)/P2s reﬂects the ”inﬂation tax” in state s,a n di s
obviously absent in 3 because the dollar price of consumption is assumed to
be constant.
Now we turn to the speciﬁcation of government ﬁnance. The home gov-
ernment inherits a debt of d dollars to foreigners which, for the time being,
is assumed to be due for repayment at the end of period 2. At that time,
the government will have some additional and exogenous need of gs units
of consumption, which is contingent on the state of nature; this is the only
source of exogenous uncertainty that we consider.
In order to ﬁnance its expenditures, the government has two potential
sources of revenue: the proceeds from the labor tax and, in a peso regime,
the revenue from creating pesos or seigniorage. In the latter case, we assume
that the seigniorage collected in period 1 can be saved in the world market at
a zero interest rate. More precisely, if in a peso regime the government issues
M∗
1 pesos in period 1, it then collects M∗
1/P1 = m∗
1 units of consumption,
worth m∗
1 dollars, that can be eﬀectively stored until period 2.
In equilibrium, the supply of pesos M∗
t must equal the demand Mt. It
follows that, in a peso regime, the government’s budget constraint in period
2 can be written as
P2s(gs + d) ≤ τsP2sls +( M2s − M1)+P2sm1
or, after dividing by P2s and rearranging,
gs + d ≤ τsls + m2s + πsm1 (7)
5The interpretation is obvious: the ﬁnal government revenue requirements,
given by the LHS, must be met by labor taxes (τsls)o rb ys e i g n i o r a g e .
Seigniorage is, in turn, the sum of a ﬂow inﬂation tax (πsm1)p l u sastock
component, m2s, as emphasized in Fischer (1982).
Under dollarization, in contrast, there is no peso creation, and the gov-
ernment ﬂow constraint is simply
gs + d ≤ τsls (8)
In other words, dollarization implies that the government loses seigniorage as
a source of real revenue. But the signiﬁcance of the seigniorage loss cannot
be evaluated independently of the determination of government policy. This
is because the seigniorage lost, m2s+πsm1, depends on policy, both through
the rate of the inﬂation tax and through the eﬀect of policy on peso demand.
This is a straightforward but important observation to which we shall return.
This completes the description of the economic environment. Of the as-
sumptions of the model, the way we have described the diﬀerence between
a dollarized regime and a peso regime deserves special comment. Imposing
that the government can choose between one or the other is crude but seems
to be reasonable, given historical experience. But we have gone beyond that
by imposing that dollars and pesos enter in exactly the same way in the rep-
resentative agent’s utility function v. Our justiﬁcation is that one typically
thinks of v as capturing the extent of the ignorance regarding transactions
costs, payments arrangements, and the like, that are reduced with the use
of a ﬁat currency. Naturally, one may conjecture that, if the relevant ﬁat
currency changes, v may itself change. However, existing monetary theory
provides essentially no guidance as to how v would change with dollarization.
And, in the dollarization debate, some have indeed argued that dollars would
provide for a ”better” currency than existing national currencies while oth-
ers have argued exactly the opposite.2 We prefer to be agnostic here. Given
the absence of better microfoundations, it is probably best to impose an as-
sumption that does not bias the desirability of dollarization in one way or
another.
2See, for instance, Hanke and Schuler (1999).
63 Dollarization and Optimal Policies
As already emphasized, the outcomes of the model, and how they are aﬀected
b yd o l l a r i z a t i o n ,d e p e n do ng o v e r n m e n tp o l i c ya n dh o wi ti sc h o s e n . E v e n
if, as we shall assume, the government is benevolent and chooses policy to
maximize the welfare of its representative citizen, the model yields diﬀerent
outcomes according to when and how strongly the government can commit
to its decisions. In this section, we assume that the government commits
perfectly to the policies it chooses at the beginning of time. In this ideal and
unrealistic situation, dollarization implies a number of costs to which we now
turn.
Consider ﬁrst the situation with a national currency. Given perfect com-
mitment, the goverment’s problem is to choose a policy and an associated
macroeconomic allocation in order to maximize the domestic agent’s expected
welfare subject to the constraints imposed by competitive equilibrium. The
latter include not only the government budget constraint but also the opti-









Formally, then, the government’s problem (sometimes called the Ramsey
problem) is to choose a policy, that is, a contingent set of labor tax rates τs
and inﬂation tax rates πs, and an aggregate allocation summarized by m1,
m2s, and ls, in order to maximize the utility function 1 subject to 7 and 9-11.
Assuming an interior solution, optimal policy must satisfy the following
version of the Ramsey rule:
1 − H￿(ls)
1 − H￿(ls) − lsH￿￿(ls)
=
1 − [v￿(m1) − u￿(e − m1)]
1 − [v￿(m1) − u￿(e − m1)] + m1[u￿￿(e − m1)+v￿￿(m1)]
(12)
for s =1 ,...,S.
3We shall assume that the individual’s solution is always interior, which may be guar-
anteed by assumptions of the Inada type on utility.
7The Ramsey rule has an intuitive interpretation. Each numerator is the
distortionary eﬀect of a tax. If, for example, the labor tax rate were zero in
state s, labor supply would satisfy H￿(ls)=1 . Hence the diﬀerence 1−H￿(ls)
is a measure of the distortion caused by τs. In turn, each denominator can
be shown to be proportional to the revenue raised by a marginal increase in
the respective tax rate. So the Ramsey rule equalizes the marginal distortion
of each tax, relative to revenue raised.
There are a number of important implications for our discussion. As long
as the government has no access to a lump sum tax, optimal policy requires
recourse to the inﬂation tax to at least some degree. This is a very general
conclusion known at least since Phelps (1973) and implies that, in our model,
it is in general optimal for the exchange rate to change in a forecastable way
over time.
In fact, in the context of the present model, there is a much stronger
implication. Since 12 must apply to all states, and the RHS is not state
contingent, that ls cannot be state contingent and, by 10, τ2s cannot either.
Hence, the revenue from labor taxation must be independent of the state of
nature and, hence, any unexpected shock to the government revenue needs
is best ﬁnanced via a devaluation. This result, which was developed in a
much more general model by Calvo and Guidotti (1993), is a consequence of
the fact that only anticipated devaluation has distortionary eﬀects: 9 implies
that only expected inﬂation aﬀects peso demand decisions. But ex post, that
is, once m1 is determined, unanticipated inﬂation acts as a lump sum tax.
Hence, as long as possible, any unanticipated government need should be
met by surprise inﬂation.
As inﬂation and devaluation coincide in this simple model, the implication
for the exchange rate regime is clear. An optimal policy calls for exchange
rates that are highly sensitive to exogenous shocks to the environment, in
this case shocks to g. Naturally, this means that curbing the needed ﬂexibility
would imply a welfare loss.
One set of restrictions is given by a regime of ﬁxed exchange rates. Sup-
pose that the government solves the same problem as before, but is commited
to keep the exchange rate ﬁxed between periods. That restriction obviously
requires that P1 = P2s,o rt h a tπs =0 ,a l ls. The resulting government’s
problem is the same as the Ramsey problem except for this additional con-
straint, and social welfare must fall in general. The loss would reﬂect the
elimination of both anticipated inﬂation, as predicted by Phelps (1973), and
unanticipated inﬂation, as implied by Calvo and Guidotti (1993).
8Under ﬁxed exchange rates, there is no ﬂow seigniorage: the term πsm1
in the government budget constraint 7 is zero. However, since m2 > 0 and
the government creates pesos at no cost, the government still collects the
stock seigniorage revenue given by m2 in 7. This is because, even if there
is no inﬂation, the government creates pesos worth m1 dollars in the ﬁrst
period and (m2 − m1) dollars in the second period.
The eﬀects of a switch to dollarization are now easy to trace. In this
model, dollarization has two important eﬀects. The ﬁrst is that inﬂation
must be zero as in the rest of the world: hence there is no ﬂow seigniorage.
The implications of this eﬀect are exactly the same as imposing ﬁxed ex-
change rates. The second eﬀect is that the government does no longer collect
the stock seigniorage: the budget constraint of the government is 8, which
excludes m2.
The government policy problem under dollarization is straightforward to
tackle directly, but it is easy and illuminating to analyze it in a slightly
diﬀerent way. Note that the real demand for money in the last period, under
either a peso regime or a dollarized regime, is given by 11, and hence m2s
must equal some noncontingent quantity ˆ m2, all s. Then rewrite the budget
constraint in the dollarized regime as
gs + d +ˆ m2 =ˆ gs + d =ˆ m2 + τsls
where ˆ gs = gs+ˆ m2. Then a moment’s thought reveals that the government’s
problem is the same as in a peso regime with ﬁxed exchange rates, except
that the government revenue needs are increased from gs to ˆ gs, that is, by
the amount of stock seigniorage.
Hence, under perfect government commitment, dollarization implies a
further welfare loss relative to a peso regime with ﬁxed exchange rates. Such
a cost is due to the loss of stock seigniorage.
Given our analysis, it is straightforward to calculate the dollar value of the
seigniorage that would be colected in a peso regime, either under the optimal
policy or ﬁxed exchange rates. Since seigniorage is zero with dollarization,
such a quantity would be a measure of the dollar cost of dollarization in terms
of lost seigniorage. But it may be more meaningful to derive an expression
for the seigniorage cost in terms of welfare.
Starting from a dollarized economy, suppose that the government were
able to print and market a quantity of pesos equal to a unit worth of con-
sumption. As we have discussed, this is equivalent, in welfare terms, to a











2 denotes the (state contingent) labor eﬀort required to ﬁnance gov-
ernment expenditures under dollarization (that is, for each s, l∗
2 solves 8 and
10). In words, the (marginal) welfare cost associated with the stock seignior-
age lost under dollarization is equal to the expected distortionary eﬀect of the
required labor taxes. The implication is that the measured loss of seigniorage
due to dollarization indeed reﬂects a welfare cost for the domestic economy.
More generally, it is clear that dollarization imposes a cost to the domestic
economy. The extent of these costs depends on the parameters of the model.
In particular, it should be obvious that the cost increases with the variability
of the government revenue needs. In this sense, our analysis is reminiscent
of the optimal currency area arguments ﬁrst proposed by Mundell (1961).
Mundell focused on the costs of irrevocably ﬁxing the exchange rate between
two countries when nominal rigidities are present. He pointed out that such
costs would be larger the less correlated were the economic shocks hitting the
two economies. This is, loosely speaking, because exchange rate changes are
more valuable as adjustment tools if the fundamentals of the two diﬀerent
countries are less synchronized.
While our analysis yields a similar conclusion, it departs from Mundel-
l’s in several ways. Mundell emphasized the role of nominal rigidities in
the analysis, while here we have emphasized public ﬁnance aspects. The
two perspectives are clearly complementary. Also, Mundell focused on the
distinction between ﬂexible and ﬁxed exchange rates without discussing the
choice of currencies. Our analysis highlights that there is a clear diﬀerence
between ﬁxed exchange rates and dollarization: stock seigniorage is lost in
the latter but not in the former.
We derived the results of this section under the maintained assumption
that the government has perfect commitment power. If such an assumption
is dropped, our results need to be severely qualiﬁed, as we shall now see.
4 Dollarization and Policy Credibility
The assumption that the government commits once and for all to a policy
choice is obviously unrealistic. In practice, governments make policy choices
10over time, although they may promise that they will take some particular
actions in the future. The sequential nature of policymaking then leads to
the possibility that the government’s promises may not be believed. This
may be the case since, when the time comes, the government’s incentives
may have changed so as to make it proﬁtable to renege. This problem was
ﬁrst recognized by Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Calvo (1978), and has
been since the subject of a huge literature on time inconsistency, credibility,
and commitment.
To illustrate the time inconsistency problem with our model, return to
the case of a peso regime with ﬂexible exchange rates, and assume that the
government can change policy in period 2, just after gs has been realized.
At that point, c1 has already been consumed, and m1 is given by previous
decisions. Hence, the government’s problem is eﬀectively to choose the labor
tax rate τs and a devaluation rate in order to maximize
c2s + v(m2s) − H(ls)
subject to its budget constraint 7 and the consumer’s optimality conditions
10 and 11. Crucially, 9 is irrelevant at this point, although it determined the
choice m1 in the previous period.
For simplicity, assume that τs must belong to the unit interval. The
analysis is easy once it is noted that, because m1 is given by history, the
inﬂation tax involves no further distortion. On the other hand, the labor tax
is associated with deadweight losses. It follows that the inﬂation tax should
be used as much as possible; the government’s choice will be either
τs =0and πsm1 = gs + d − ˆ m2 (13)
or
πs =1and gs + d − m1 − ˆ m2 = τsls (14)
where ls is determined by 10 and ˆ m2 by 10.
Clearly, this solution departs from the Ramsey rule. This is clear if 13
holds, that is, if the revenue from the inﬂation tax is enough by itself to cover
the government needs in state s. In that case, labor taxes will be zero if the
government can reoptimize in period 2, but the Ramsey rule and, therefore,
the optimal policy under commitment stipulate that labor taxes be positive
in all states. Obviously, the departure from the optimal policy is even greater
if 14 holds, as the inﬂation rate is inﬁnite. This is interpretable as a total
repudiation of the pesos issued in period 1.
11Assuming rational expectations, the representative agent will understand
that, in the absence of government commitment, the inﬂation tax in period 2
will be given by 13-14 no matter what the government announces in the ﬁrst
period. And, accordingly, this will aﬀect period 1 money demand, as given
by 9. Clearly, m1 will be smaller than under commitment, since inﬂationary
revenues must be larger. But then πs must be even larger than if m1 had been
chosen on the basis of expectations that the optimal policy would be followed.
The outcome will be given by the simultaneous solution of the money demand
equation 9 and the government’s optimality conditions 13-14. This, of course,
tends to lead to a particularly bad outcome. The worst outcome happens if 14
holds for all s. Then, money demand in period 1 satisﬁes u￿(e−m1)=v￿(m1).
If this implies a small m1, the revenue from the labor tax must be relatively
large. The public’s anticipation of hyperinﬂation then may reduce money
demand to such an extent that not only the hyperinﬂation happens, but also
distortionary labor taxation must increase relative to the commitment case.
Note that the government would like to make the public believe that
it will implement the Ramsey policy. However, the absence of commitment
implies that any announcement to that eﬀect will be incredible. In this sense,
the time inconsistency problem is one possible way to model a government
with a ”credibility problem.”
This perspective may also help understand institutions and rules that
one observes in practice: they may be designed to alleviate a government’s
credibility problem or, in our context, act as commitment devices. The
general idea is that, while the government may not be able to commit to
complicated date and state contingent Ramsey policies, it may commit to
simpler rules such as zero inﬂation or pegged exchange rates.
To illustrate, suppose that the government can commit to a ﬁxed exchange
rate or, in our context, to a ﬁxed price level. Such a commitment means that
πs =0 ,a l ls. Then, the money demand equation 9, with π =0 , determines
m1. In addition, even if the government is able to reoptimize in period 2, the
labor tax rate in period s is determined by 7, with πs =0 , 10, and 11. But
these are the exact conditions that determine the outcome of the commitment
case with ﬁxed exchange rates. In other words, if the government can indeed
make an irrevocable commitment to ﬁxing the exchange rate, the credibility
problem ceases to be relevant.
On the other hand, as we saw in the preceding subsection, ﬁxing the
exchange rate involves a welfare loss relative to the Ramsey policy. So, in
the absence of commitment, expected welfare under ﬁxed exchange rates may
12or may not improve. There is a tradeoﬀ between credibility and ﬂexibility,
and the better choice depends on model parameters.
When available, the option to dollarize the economy may be valuable if
even a limited commitment to ﬁxed exchange rates is impossible. This may
be the case, for instance, if the government in period 1 is able to promise not
to devalue, but only if it stays in power. If there is a positive probability that
the government will be replaced in period 2, a n de v e ni ft h en e wg o v e r n m e n t
is itself benevolent, a credibility problem remains. In contrast, by dollarizing
the economy, the period 1 government in eﬀect would change the taxation
technology so as to take away the inﬂation tax from any successor.
Clearly, if the economy is dollarized, the credibility problem goes away,
and the outcome is the same as that of a dollarized economy under commit-
ment. This means that dollarization involves its own costs. In particular,
stock seigniorage is lost; this means that dollarization may or may not be
preferable to keeping a national currency, even if the latter option involves
living with a policy credibility problem.
Our analysis thus yield several implications that are relevant for the cur-
rent debate on dollarization. The ﬁrst is that, as we have just established,
even if a government suﬀers from poor credibility, and even if dollarization
would improve credibility, it is not necessarily the case that dollarization
is desirable. Whether dollarization is preferable to ﬂexible rates in such a
situation has to be demonstrated empirically.
A second noteworthy implicationconcerns the interpretationof the seignior-
age that would be lost with dollarization. In a peso regime, and in the ab-
sence of commitment, one would observe that the government is collecting
a nonzero seigniorage revenue. That revenue, which is straightforward to
calculate, would be lost with dollarization. However, this would not mean
that the loss of seigniorage, however big, is costly for the economy. Indeed,
it would be quite possible for expected welfare to improve with dollarization,
in whose case the elimination of seigniorage would be good for the economy.
The lesson is that the numerous calculations of the seigniorage that would
be lost with dollarization are meaningful only in conjunction with some ex-
plicit or implicit assumption about the policymaking process and, in partic-
ular, of the credibility problem that may be aﬀecting policy. Only in the
absence of such credibility problems one can assert unambiguously that the
loss of seigniorage would, in fact, be a loss. If there is a credibility prob-
lem, the interpretation is much more problematic and, as we have argued,
the loss of seigniorage may in fact be beneﬁcial in welfare terms. This point
13seems to have been missed by even advocates of dollarization, which in gen-
eral concede that the loss of seigniorage should be counted as one price to
pay. At the same time, this observation has a bearing on the debate about
how much seigniorage should be ”rebated” by the U.S. Federal Reserve to a
dollarizing country. For, if eliminating seigniorage is already good for that
country’s residents, why should the U.S. taxpayers give them back the value
of seigniorage in addition?
A similar observation applies to ”optimal currency area” arguments. Un-
der commitment, an increase of the variability of exogenous shocks unambigu-
ously raises the value of ﬂexibility and increases the welfare loss associated
with dollarization. However, this is not necessarily the case in the absence
of commitment: since the equilibrium policy in a peso regime is suboptimal,
there is no presumption that increased uncertainty will raise its value rela-
tive to that of dollarization. Hence, the calculation of ”Mundellian” criteria
to evaluate the welfare cost of dollarization requires a further justiﬁcation
unless one assumes away policy credibility problems.4
We close this subsection with three remarks. Once the economy is dollar-
ized, there would remain a strong incentive for the government to reintroduce
a national currency. Consider again the possibility that the original govern-
ment is replaced by a new one in period 2. Even if the ﬁrst government had
dollarized the economy, the new government would beneﬁt from reintroduc-
ing the peso and collect the stock seigniorage ˆ m2. While a more sophisticated
analysis of a possible ”dedollarization” would require a model with more pe-
riods, it should be noted that it is an open problem in the absence of policy
commitments, and that there is a temptation to go back that can be mea-
sured by the stock of domestic base money (Fischer 1982).
Second, and more generally, the credibility case for dollarization takes it
for granted that dollarization is available as a commitment device. But the
validity of such an assumption is not obvious, so it is desirable to ask how
dollarization may come to enjoy such a special status.
Third, it must be noted that there may be other solutions to the policy
credibility problem that do not involve ﬁxed exchange rates, dollarization,
and the like. Particularly, if the economy and its government are both long
lived, the government’s temptation to depart from Ramsey policies may be
tempered by the adverse eﬀect of the deviation on the public’s expectations
4Panizza, Stein, and Talvi (2000) attempts to evaluate and compare some of these
considerations for a number of Central American economies.
14about future policies. This implies that the Ramsey outcome may be self
sustaining as an equilibrium, even if the government must choose its actions
sequentially (Barro and Gordon 1983).
5 Dollarization and the Lender of Last Re-
sort
The recent crises in emerging markets have underscored a crucial question:
what is the role of exchange rate policy in the generation and/or prevention
of those crises? Arguably, it is this issue that has provided the main impe-
tus for dollarization proposals in developing countries. And, paradoxically,
consideration of the same question has led to calls for the exact opposite,
ﬂexible exchange rates.
The debate has been inﬂuenced by some prominent aspects of observed
crises. In them, the ﬁnancial system, and particularly domestic banks, played
a key role. Exchange rate pegs often collapsed as the central bank was at-
tempting to bail out the domestic ﬁnancial system in the midst of a panic.5
The panic was possible, in turn, because the countries that went into crises
were in a state of international illiquidity: their short term potential liabil-
ities, measured in international currency, clearly exceeded the value of the
assets they could have access to on short notice.6
In this context, it has been argued that dollarization would make crises
more likely by preventing the domestic central bank from acting as a domestic
lender of last resort. Loosely speaking, a lender of last resort is an institution
that stands ready to provide credit to banks in the event that they experience
a sudden demand for liquidity, as when bank runs occur. Such an institution
is crucial in a system of banks with fractional reserves in order to reassure
bank depositors and short-term creditors that their claims on the banks will
always be honored if they attempt to liquidate them. This may help prevent
conﬁdence crises and associated bank runs.
In most countries, the role of lender of last resort has traditionally been
played by central banks. This role is natural because the central bank can
5That this association was systematic was convincingly shown by Kaminsky and Rein-
hart (1999).
6See Chang and Velasco (2000a) for a more detailed discussion and analysis of the
evidence.
15create credit quickly and at a negligible cost simply by issuing domestic cur-
rency. But the ability to print currency would disappear under dollarization,
and hence the central bank would no longer be able to serve as the lender of
last resort.
Making full justice to this issue would require a proper modeling of ﬁ-
nancial institutions, as in Chang and Velasco (2000b). However, a relatively
minor amendment of our model here hopefully suﬃces to give a ﬂavor of the
argument, as well as help evaluating its signiﬁcance.
So far the debt d of the government has played a negligible role, and in
fact we have treated it just as another revenue requirement due at the end
of period 2. Let us suppose now that the debt d is of short maturity, in the
sense that it is due for repayment at the beginning of period 2, after gs is
realized but before markets open.
To be concrete, assume that d i so w e db yt h eh o m eg o v e r n m e n tt oac o n -
tinuum of identical foreigners. If the continuum is assumed to have measure
one, the representative creditor is owed d dollars at the beginning of period
2. The problem is that, at that time, the government may not have d dollars
to repay its obligations due. The only way the government may cope with
early requests for repayments is by printing pesos.
Let us suppose that each foreigner decides, simultaneously, whether or
not to demand repayment of his share. If he does not, his share is rolled over
until the end of the period with no interest. But if he does, he is entitled to
early repayment from the government.
Finally, we assume that early withdrawals are costly for the government:
the government’s revenue needs at the end of the period increase with early
repayments. In particular, if all creditors demand early repayment, the rev-
enue needs change from gs to gs + χ, for some χ>0.
We are ready to analyze the outcomes of alternative exchange rate regimes.
For simplicity, suppose that the government has perfect commitment power,
and consider ﬁxed exchange rates. In particular, for each state s, the gov-
ernment budget constraint 7 (with πs =0 ) holds; note that d still denotes
the initial debt, but now it is interpreted as a short term debt. This implies
that, if all creditors agree to roll over their debt holdings, it is individually
optimal for each of them to do so. This is because, if all of the debt is rolled
over, the government will have enough resources to honor it in full. Hence,
each creditor is guaranteed that its debt will be repaid if rolled over. In other
words, it is an equilibrium outcome for the creditors not to run.
16However, suppose that also
T + ˆ m2 <g s + d + χ (15)
where T denotes the maximum revenue from labor taxes (that is, the max-
imum value of τsls subject to 10). Then, if all creditors panic and demand
early repayment, there is no feasible combination of labor taxation and money
creation that allows the government to both meet its revenue requirements
and its debt obligations. Under plausible auxiliary assumptions,7 there will
be default on the foreign debt, which makes it optimal for the foreign creditors
to demand early repayment. In other words, a panic is also an equilibrium.
The commitment to a ﬁxed exchange rate is at least partly to blame for
the possibility of runs. To see this, assume that, in addition,
gs + d + χ<T+ ˆ m2 + m1 (16)
Then, if the commitment to a ﬁxed rate is dropped, there is a government
policy such that a run cannot take place in any equilibrium. Suppose that all
foreign creditors demand early repayment. Then the government can oﬀer
to cancel its debt by paying L = P2sd pesos to each creditor, where P2s is
the exchange rate (and the price level) that is (rationally) anticipated to
prevail at the end of period 2. If so, each lender would be happy to take the
L pesos as repayment of his claim, as he anticipates that he will be able to
exchange them for d dollars before the end of the day. Alternatively, it can be
assumed that the government prints L pesos to purchase consumption goods
from home agents, and then sells the consumption goods for the d dollars it
needs.
It can be now checked that the condition 16 guarantees that there is a
labor tax rate, a ﬁnal supply of pesos, and a price P2s such that the govern-
ment will also be able to ﬁnance its ﬁnal revenue requirement gs + χ with
a combination of labor taxes and money issue. But then, there is no reason
for foreigners to demand early repayment or, in other words, a run cannot
happen in equilibrium.
Two remarks are in order. The ﬁrst is that, if the run condition 15
holds, preventing runs is not consistent with a ﬁxed exchange rate: out of
7In particular, suppose that at the end of the period the government must pay for its
exogenous revenue needs before it can pay any creditors left. Then, under 15, if a run
occurs then the government will not have enough money to pay any debt rolled over. This
means that it is optimal for each individual creditor to demand early repayment, as he
would not collect anything if he agreed to roll over his claim.
17equilibrium, the inﬂation tax must be used. In that sense, exchange rate
ﬂexibility plays a useful role.
Second, the reader may ﬁnd little resemblance between the scenario just
described and the common meaning of ”last resort lending.” But this objec-
tion may be more apparent than real. When the government prints pesos to
face early withdrawals, it is in eﬀect creating credit to lend to itself. More
vividly, suppose that the government is composed of a Treasury, which is the
initial debtor, collects the labor tax, and pays for government purchases, and
a central bank which prints pesos and collects seigniorage. Then the same
results would obtain and, at the same time, with ﬂexible exchange rates one
can think of the pesos issued in a run as an emergency loan from the central
bank to the Treasury.
The shortcomings of ﬁxed exchange rates are shared by dollarization.
In fact, the situation is even worse. The condition for runs to be possible
becomes
T<g s + d + χ (17)
since dollarization implies that stock seigniorage is not available to the home
government. In fact, it is possible that for 15 to fail and 17 to hold; in such
a case, crises are not possible in a peso regime, even one of ﬁxed exchange
rates, but they may occur with dollarization.
Advocates of dollarization admit that it would prevent the central bank
f r o ma c t i n ga sad o m e s t i cl e n d e ro fl a s tr e s o r t ,b u tt h a tt h i sm a yn o tb et o o
diﬃcult to deal with. One way to cope with the possibility of ﬁnancial panics,
which Argentina actually implemented, would be to secure foreign lines of
short term credit to be drawn upon in the event of a run. It should be clear
that such a strategy would succeed in eliminating equilibrium runs in our
model. Take the dollarized case, and assume that the home government had
the right to borrow, at the beginning of period 2,a tl e a s tgs+d+χ−T from
some foreign agent or institution, at a zero interest rate. Then it is obvious
that there cannot be a run in equilibrium.
This suggests that the welfare impact of losing the central bank’s ability
to be the lender of last resort can be measured by the cost of a contingent
line of credit large enough to prevent runs. What ”large enough” means is
debatable. In light of our model, and recalling the meaning of international
illiquidity, the size of the credit line should be at least as large as the gap
between the potential short run liabilities and assets of the ﬁnancial system,
which can be substantial. In particular, the Argentinean credit lines are
18unlikely to have met this criterion. On the other hand, the ”commitment
rate” at which the Argentinean lines were secured were small enough that
the total cost of the strategy would have been relatively small even if the
credit line had to increase severalfold.8
Note that, as in many models that deliver multiple equilibria, we have
not speciﬁed which equilibrium obtains when several exist. This is not too
diﬃcult to deal with, and in the literature it is often assumed that one of
the equilibria is selected by some otherwise irrelevant random device, such
as animal spirits or sunspots.9 Such a selection mechanism would have the
noteworthy implication that, observationally, it may seem that a change from
a peso regime to dollarization exacerbates the role of exogenous uncertainty.
This would be the case if the economy was immune to runs in the peso regime
but subject to runs under dollarization. This is an important observation
insofar as some have claimed that one of the advantages of dollarization is
that it would reduce the severity of exogenous shocks. Our analysis implies
exactly the opposite.
In the same scenario, the contractual interest rate on loans to the home
country would be higher than the world interest rate in cases in which runs
occured with nonzero probability. This risk premium would compensate
foreign creditors for the probability of debt default. But the implication is
that, in this model, dollarization may well be associated with an increase in
the dollar interest rate applicable to the home country. This is in contrast
with claims that dollarization would reduce the cost of foreign credit.10
8Here is a very rough calculation of the cost of the Argentinean strategy. In 1996 the
Argentinean private line of credit reached U.S. $6.1 billion, at a cost of about U.S. $18
million a year-about 0.3 percent. Assuming that this rate remains the same, the total
cost of the strategy would depend on how large a credit line is ”enough.” At the end
of 1999, Argentina’s M2 (the sum of its banking system monetary and quasimonetary
liabilities) was U.S. $88.2 billion. Since it had U.S. $26.5 in international reserves, the
banking system’s net liquid liabilities were arguably as large as U.S. $88.2 - U.S. $26.5 =
U.S. $51.7 billion. At 0.3 percent a year, a line of credit large enough to cover that amount
in whole would cost somewhat more than U.S. $150 million per year. While this is not a
negligible ﬁgure, it is only a small fraction of Argentina’s GDP.
9See Chang and Velasco (2000c) for a formalization of this idea in the ﬁnancial panics
context.
10See Powell and Sturzenegger (2000) for an empirical assessment of such a claim.
196 Some Arguments in Need of a Theory
There are a number of arguments related to the dollarization debate that,
to date, have not been formalized with the tools of modern economic the-
ory. Many of these arguments sound plausible, but their relative importance
will remain unknown unless more progress is made in formulating them ad-
equately.
The ﬁrst contention is that dollarization would be beneﬁcial by reducing
transactions costs, such as the costs of calculating dollar equivalents of na-
tional currency quantities. In principle, one can hardly disagree with this
claim. However, measuring its signiﬁcance is much trickier. For one thing,
the transactions costs relevant for the argument are likely to be very small.
Also, including them into economic models has proven to be much harder
than expected, and no satisfactory and tractable procedure has emerged.
As a consequence, measures of the quantitative importance of transactions
costs have played little role in the debate. Finally, the transactions costs in
question are likely to be already negligible in a system of irrevocably ﬁxed ex-
change rates, and hence the marginal savings that dollarization would bring
along this dimension are arguably insigniﬁcant.
A second argument, this one voiced by some opponents of dollarization,
is that currencies are national symbols, and hence their elimination would be
costly in terms of national pride, identity, and the like. Such an argument is
sometimes politically eﬀective and, in spite of its being quickly dismissed by
many economists, may have some validity. However, how to formalize it or
assess its economic importance is competely unknown.
A third claim is that dollarization would reduce market incompleteness.
For example, Hausmann (1999) stated that ”[Dollarization] would expand
the menu of ﬁnancial options open to emerging-market governments and
ﬁrms and, in so doing, would increase ﬁnancial stability.” Again, this is not
an implausible claim, but is one that cannot be analyzed in the context of
standard models. This is because standard models take the degree of market
completeness as a given. To our knowledge, there is no theory dealing with
how dollarization would ”expand the menu of ﬁnancial options,” let alone
what implications such an expansion would have on allocations and welfare.
Finally, consider the claim that oﬃcial dollarization is presumably bene-
ﬁcial because it would legalize the spontaneous dollarization that is already
observed in several countries. At one level, our analysis can be amended in
a straightforward manner to deal with such an argument. One may suppose
20that, before dollarization is imposed by policy, the home agent derives util-
ity not only from holding pesos but also from holding dollars. This can be
formalized by making v depend on some aggregate of the real value of pesos
and dollars, a modeling device that has been employed in the literature on
currency substitution. The resulting extension is likely to yield essentially
the same lessons as the original model and, in that sense, the observation
of currency substitution by itself does not provide independent support for
dollarization.
We admit, though, that the fact that dollarization is already taking place
in many countries may reﬂect the eﬀect of some fundamentals about which
we know little or nothing; such an eﬀect is buried in the speciﬁcation of the
v function in our model. Given this, it may be not implausible to conjecture
that the way such fundamentals work may change, in a favorable way, if
dollarization was made oﬃcial. However, such a conjecture needs to be made
explicit and cast in terms of modern economic theory if it is to become more
than wishful thinking.
7F i n a l R e m a r k s
We have conducted a fairly thorough, although surely not exhaustive, discus-
sion of the theoretical issues associated with dollarization. Our analysis has
been organized around a simple, single framework, that can be extended in
many directions. We emphasize that the study of a single framework is useful
for at least two reasons. It gives readers an idea of how the diﬀerent aspects
of the dollarization debate are related to each other. And such a modelling
strategy provides the foundation for a satisfactory quantitative comparison
of the associated costs and beneﬁts.
We have borrowed from previous literature, and we have also provided
new observations, for and against dollarization. Among the former, we noted
that calculations of seigniorage loss should no longer be automatically taken
as a con of dollarization. Among the latter, we emphasized that there is no
presumption that dollarization should reduce interest rates.
Perhaps most importantly, we have identiﬁed some arguments that are
lacking satisfactory theoretical foundations. Given the interest on dollariza-
tion, these arguments remain fertile ground for future research.
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